Read the passage below and solve the questions based on it.
Deliberative democracy demands a reflexive (or reflection driven) reordering of preferences in a non-coercive manner. The authenticity of democracy requires in addition that these reflective preferences, influence collective outcomes and action, and so long as the state is the main (though far from exclusive) locus of collective decisions; it requires discursive mechanisms for transmission of public opinion to the state. A deliberative or more properly a discursive democracy, in order that it can accommodate several competing versions of democracies such as the liberal, the minimal, the difference, etc., must also accommodate rhetoric, narratives, and empathy along with reasoning. A rationality and a reasoning that does not accommodate values is meaningless. However, it is also argued that individual rationality cannot be realised if values are embedded in the decision procedures, in other words, realisation of values could be made possible only when individuals behave non-rationally. Further if values having been abandoned at the individual level are accorded a place only collectively, the same must lead to either “epistemological inconsistency or abandonment of autonomy of individual evaluations”. A talk or a rhetoric, otherwise, is strategic and is employed with the intention of signaling certain information. Such a talk can be therefore deceptive and coercive. The illocutionary force and the normative trappings of a Foucauldian discourse while allowing identification with a community and differences with the others, do simultaneously pose through coercion a threat to an utterance as such. If democracy cannot ensure utterance as freedom and if the illocutionary forces in a discursive democracy disciplines the thought and the talk, then how such a democracy could indeed be called authentic!
Most human actions and discourses are actuated by a deeper or primordial ante-deliberation Desire (let us use a capital D). Speaking as such is out of such a Desire (one might use volition or passion). Engaging in a deliberation or else in an action is possible only since there has been such a Desire. Desire appears to both the reflection and also to an observer as a mental-state. A discourse can be set only when such mental states are in harmony, or share a common predisposition or attitude. In the absence of such shared mental-states, no discourse and no deliberation can begin. A running underlying and most often unstated theme that remains at the back of the idea of deliberative democracy is competition – a competition with the ‘other’ which introduces strategy. The alternative to competition, a mental-state which is out of a Desire to enjoy the ‘other’ in the light of a memory that this ‘one’ and the ‘other’ were but the same and would again become the same, do not appear in the known Anglo-American literature. Such a mental-state might generate and keep alive possibilities, of cooperation although is never a state of cooperation alone as such.
Which of the following captures the spirit of the position that the author hints at through the phrase ‘alternative to competition’?